Hyper-realistic face masks in a live passport-checking task by Robertson, David J. et al.
  
 
1
Hyper-realistic face masks in a live passport-checking task 
 
David J. Robertson1, 2*, Jet G. Sanders1,3, Alice Towler1, 4, Robin S. S. Kramer1, 5, Josh 
Spowage1, 5, Ailish Byrne1, 6, A. Mike Burton1 & Rob Jenkins1 
 
1 Department of Psychology, University of York, UK 
2 School of Psychological Sciences and Health, University of Strathclyde, UK 
3 Department of Psychology and Behavioural Sciences, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, UK 
4 School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Australia 
5 School of Psychology, University of Lincoln, UK 
6 Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, UK 
7 Department of Psychology, Edge Hill University, UK 
 
*Corresponding author 
David J. Robertson, School of Psychological Sciences and Health, University of Strathclyde, 
Glasgow, G1 1QE. E-Mail: david.j.robertson@strath.ac.uk 
 
Funding 
The research was partly funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, UK 
(ES/J022950/1) (AMB). The London Science Museum contributed £1,107.40 to cover 
the cover the travel/accommodation costs of the experimenters (DJR, JS, AT, RSSK, 
JS, AB). The funders had no role in the study design, data collection and analysis, 
decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. 
 
  
 
2
Abstract 
Hyper-realistic face masks have been used as disguises in at least one border crossing, 
and in numerous criminal cases. Experimental tests using these masks have shown that 
viewers accept them as real faces under a range of conditions. Here, we tested mask detection 
in a live identity verification task. Fifty-four visitors at the London Science Museum viewed 
a mask wearer at close range (2 metres) as part of a mock passport check. They then 
answered a series of questions designed to assess mask detection, while the masked traveller 
was still in view. In the identity matching task, 8% of viewers accepted the mask as matching 
a real photo of someone else, and 82% accepted the match between masked person and 
masked photo. When asked if there was any reason to detain the traveller, only 13% of 
viewers mentioned a mask. A further 11% picked disguise from a list of suggested reasons. 
Even after reading about mask-related fraud, 10% of viewers judged that the traveller was not 
wearing a mask. Overall, mask detection was poor, and was not predicted by unfamiliar face 
matching performance. We conclude that hyper-realistic face masks could go undetected 
during live identity checks.  
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Introduction 
Relying on unfamiliar face recognition to verify identity is an important aspect of 
national security (Robertson & Burton, 2016). In the context of border control, officials are 
routinely required to decide whether a traveller’s passport photo matches the traveller’s face. 
False acceptance in this situation could result in an identity fraudster entering the country. 
Despite the social and economic investment in face-photo ID in security critical situations, 
matching instances of unfamiliar faces remains highly prone to error (Papesh, 2018; 
Robertson, 2018; White, Kemp, Jenkins, Matheson, & Burton, 2014). It is also a process that 
fraudsters wishing to deceive ID checkers actively exploit (Robertson, Kramer, & Burton, 
2017; Robertson, et al. 2018).  
Opportunistic identity fraud relies on the fraudster obtaining photo-ID of someone who 
looks similar to them. In such cases, fraudsters can increase the likelihood of their deception 
succeeding by disguising their own face so that it looks more like the face of their victim. 
Traditional methods of disguise have tended to focus on simple paraphernalia such as glasses 
and wigs (Dhamecha, Singh, Vatsa, & Kumar, 2014; Kramer & Ritchie, 2016; Righi, Peissig, 
& Tarr, 2012; Terry, 1994). However, a number of recent criminal cases have raised the 
profile of a different approach—hyper-realistic silicone masks that completely transform the 
appearance of the wearer (Sanders et al., 2017; Sanders & Jenkins, 2018).     
In one widely cited example, a young Asian man used a hyper-realistic mask to 
impersonate an elderly Caucasian man whose passport he had stolen. Wearing the mask, the 
fraudster passed through several identity checks at Hong Kong airport and successfully 
boarded a flight to Canada. The deception was only detected when he removed the mask 
during the flight, and a fellow traveller reported the incident to the crew (Zamost, 2010). This 
example suggests that hyper-realistic face masks can be sufficiently convincing to pass for 
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real faces. Importantly, this appears to be the case even at passport control, where an 
official’s attention is directly focused on facial image comparison. 
Despite the threat posed by this new type of fraud, few experiments have addressed 
detection of hyper-realistic face masks. Sanders et al. (2017; Experiment 1) asked participants 
to rate the appearance of 20 face photos on (task irrelevant) social dimensions such as 
attractiveness. Unbeknownst to the participants, one of these photos showed a person wearing 
a hyper-realistic mask. Following the rating task, participants were given the opportunity to 
report this imposter in a series of increasingly leading questions. None of the participants 
reported the presence of the mask spontaneously, or when prompted with a general question 
about the appearance of the faces. Moreover, only 22% of participants guessed that the face 
images included a mask when explicitly asked. When shown an array of all the images and 
asked to pick out the mask, 30% of participants missed the mask, and nearly every real face 
was singled out as the mask by at least one participant. These findings suggest that the 
detection of hyper-realistic masks is difficult when comparing photos. Even when the viewer 
is aware that a mask is present, detection levels remain far from perfect.  
Sanders et al. (2017; Experiment 3) also examined detection of masks in live viewing. 
As seen in Figure 1, a mask-wearing confederate sat at a bench on a university campus, and 
experimenters stopped passers-by to ask them questions about the confederate’s appearance. 
Respondents viewed the confederate at a distance of 5 metres (Near) or 10 metres (Far). As 
with the photographic study, participants were initially asked to rate the individual on social 
dimensions such as attractiveness. They then turned toward the experimenter (away from the 
confederate) to answer the open, prompted, and explicit questions concerning mask detection. 
None of the participants in the Far condition (10m), and only 6% of those in the Near 
condition (5m), reported the presence of a mask in the open or prompted report. For the 
explicit report question (i.e. was that person wearing a hyper-realistic mask), only 43% of 
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participants reported that the confederate was wearing a mask (detection rates were 
significantly higher for those viewing from 5m than 10m). 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of live viewing conditions from Sanders et al (2017; Experiment 3). 
The images show the confederate (author RJ) wearing the mask (left), the confederate’s real 
face (right). Images reproduced with permission of the authors.  
 
To summarise Sanders et al.’s (2017) study, detection of hyper-realistic masks was 
poor in both photographic viewing and in live viewing. These low detection rates suggest that 
hyper-realistic masks may provide a viable route to identity fraud. Here, we assess this 
possibility directly in a mock border control scenario. Our study design extends the preceding 
work in four important ways. First, we modelled aspects of a border control setting to test 
whether participants would ever accept a masked imposter as a match for a real passport 
photo. The context of a passport document has previously been shown to boost acceptance 
rates in facial image comparison (McCaffery & Burton, 2016). Second, we used concurrent 
perceptual matching rather than immediate memory when assessing detection. That is, 
participants completed the image comparison task and the mask detection questions (open, 
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prompted, and explicit) with the mask wearer directly in view. Third, we used a closer 
viewing distance. Sanders et al. (2017) used ‘social’ viewing distances of 5 metres and 10 
metres, but passport checks are typically carried out at 1–2 metres (Noyes & Jenkins, 2017; 
Verhoff, Witzel, Kreutz, & Ramsthaler, 2008). We use a viewing distance of 2 metres to 
capture this applied constraint. Finally, we examined individual differences in face matching 
ability. Here, we assess whether those who score highly on the Glasgow Face Matching Test 
(Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010; Robertson, Noyes, Dowsett, Jenkins, & Burton, 2016), are 
more likely to detect a hyper-realistic face mask. We expected that the gravitas of the 
passport context, the availability of the masked face during the task, the closer viewing 
distance, and the high face-matching aptitude of some observers would lead to high detection 
rates for the mask. 
 
Methods 
Ethics Statement 
This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology, 
University of York and the London Science Museum. All participants provided written 
informed consent. The participants shown in Figure 3 provided appropriate photographic 
release. 
 
Participants 
Fifty-four participants (37 female, 17 male) with a mean age of 28 years (SD = 7, 
Range = 18–49) volunteered as part of a public engagement event at the London Science 
Museum. During the experimental debrief all participants confirmed that they had no prior 
knowledge that a hyper-realistic mask was being used in this study.  
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Design and Procedure 
Overview 
Testing took place on a single evening at the London Science Museum. The study 
comprised three phases, and all participants completed these phases in the same sequence. In 
Phase 1, we used the short version of the Glasgow Face Matching Test (GFMT) to estimate 
unfamiliar face matching ability. For Phase 2, participants proceeded to a mock passport 
control area. The task in this phase was to verify the identity of a traveller (an experimental 
confederate) by comparing a passport photo to his live appearance. Finally, in Phase 3, 
participants completed a short questionnaire that was designed to assess detection of the 
hyper-realistic face mask. Together, these measures allowed us to estimate both the rate of 
mask detection and the predictive value of face matching accuracy in this situation. The 
testing space was divided into three areas—a GFMT testing area, a passport control area, and 
a debrief area. The layout ensured that participants could not see the traveller before entering 
the passport control area, and could not hear the debrief before entering the debrief area. 
 
Phase 1: Face matching ability 
The short version of the GFMT consists of 40 pairs of unfamiliar faces photos 
presented in a random sequence on a computer screen. In 20 of these pairs, both photos show 
the same identity. In the remaining 20 pairs, the two photos show different identities. For 
each pair, the participants’ task is to decide whether the photos show the same person or two 
different people. Participants’ scores out of 40 are converted to percentage scores for 
analysis. 
 
Phase 2: Mock Passport Check  
Passport Photo to Face Matching 
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To reinforce the participant’s role as passport checker, and to approximate the real-
world visual demands of photo-to-face comparison, we embedded the face photographs in 
realistic passport documents, as seen in Figure 2 (McCaffery & Burton, 2016). The 
demographic information (e.g. sex, date of birth) in these documents was the same for match 
and mismatch images. Pilot testing confirmed that this information was plausible for both the 
face photos and mask wearer. We created two versions of the mock passport. The first 
version contained a photo of experimental confederate Josh (author JS) wearing the hyper-
realistic mask (photo taken two weeks before testing). This version allowed us to examine 
detection of a mask that was presented live and in the ID document. The second version 
contained a photo of a real person (no mask) whose facial appearance was similar to the mask 
(i.e. young white male with dark hair). This version models a form of identity fraud in which 
a fraudster has obtained a mask that resembles the identity in the stolen document. The two 
versions of the passport were alternated across participants. In each case, the participants’ 
task was to decide whether the photo in the passport showed Josh or someone else (identity 
matching).  
 
 
Figure 2. Mock passport check (due to copyright reasons we cannot show the actual 
passports used in the study, however, the images that we present here are a close 
approximation). The left panel shows a mock passport containing a photo of a real face (due 
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to copyright reasons we could not show the actual foil identity used in the study). The right 
panel shows a mock passport containing a photo of the masked confederate. Participants 
received either a passport containing a photo of the foil identity or of the confederate wearing 
the mask, and were asked to decide whether the face in the passport photo matched the 
person in front of them (viewing distance 2m). 
 
Masked confederate 
An experimental confederate, Josh (author JS, real face included in Appendix images), 
played the role of traveller. Josh was seated 2 metres from the participants’ desk for the 
duration of testing, as seen in Figure 3. Unbeknowst to the participants, Josh was wearing a 
hyper-realistic silicone mask (the ‘Male Model’ mask, from Realflesh Masks, Montreal, 
Quebec). This aspect of the study was not mentioned to participants until debriefing. 
Participants were instructed that the traveller was returning to the UK from Spain. Josh was 
provided with props (e.g., hand luggage with an ‘I love Barcelona’ sticker) to reinforce this 
cover story. Our main interest was (i) the participant’s response to the identity comparison, 
and (ii) whether the participant noticed the mask. 
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Figure 3. The passport control area showing (left) participants carrying out the mock 
passport check, and (right) masked confederate Josh from the participant’s point of view (2m 
viewing distance). Participants shown in Figure 3 provided appropriate photographic release. 
 
Phase 3: Mask detection 
Following Sanders et al. (2017), the questionnaire comprised a series of increasingly 
leading items. The first item (spontaneous detection) allowed participants to report 
spontaneously that the traveller was wearing a mask (open response). The second item 
(prompted detection) raised the possibility that the traveller was wearing a disguise (checklist 
responses). The third item (categorical detection) asked directly whether or not the traveller 
was wearing a mask (Yes/No response). The three questions were printed on separate pages 
so that participants could only advance to the next question after being instructed to do so by 
the experimenter. The questions were as follows: 
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Spontaneous Detection (open response) 
Regardless of whether the passport photo shows Josh or not, is there any other reason 
why you would not allow him to enter the UK? 
 
Prompted Detection (checklist responses) 
Has Josh disguised his appearance (Y/N)? [critical item]. Is Josh’s date of birth 
suspicious (Y/N)? Should Josh’s luggage be searched for drugs (Y/N)? Do you suspect that 
Josh is carrying more than the 4-litre allowance of wine in his luggage (Y/N)? Josh claims to 
have been in Spain for a business trip. Is there any reason to believe that this was not the true 
purpose of his visit (Y/N)? If you have circled ‘Yes’ to any of the questions above, please 
briefly explain why in the response box below.  
 
Categorical Detection (Yes/No response) 
This workshop runs for over three hours. Half the time Josh will be a regular law 
abiding traveller. At other times Josh is a fraudster and will be wearing a hyper-realistic face 
mask. He does this to make himself look more like the person whose passport he has stolen. 
Is Josh wearing a hyper-realistic mask right now? (Circle ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ and briefly describe 
why you have made that choice in the response box below).  
 
Results 
Face matching ability 
Mean accuracy on the GFMT was 82% (SD = 12%; Range = 50–100%). Importantly, 
as this test was administered to the general public in a museum setting, this distribution was 
very similar to published norms (Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010; N = 194; M = 81%, SD = 
10%, Range = 50–100%). 
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Mock passport check 
We analysed responses in the passport check separately for the two versions of the 
passport document. For the version containing a photo of Josh wearing the mask, the 
acceptance rate was 82%. For the version containing a photo of someone else (no mask), the 
acceptance rate was 8%.  
 
Mask Detection  
Mask detection data are summarised in Table 1. Only 13% of participants 
spontaneously reported that the traveller was wearing a mask. Of the remaining participants, 
a further 11% indicated when prompted that the traveller had disguised his appearance. 
 
Table 1. Proportion (%) of participants who detected (Yes) or did not detect (No) the mask at 
each detection stage. 
Detection stage Yes (%) No (%) 
Spontaneous detection 13 87 
Prompted detection 11 89 
Categorical detection 90 10 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, viewers were more likely to query the purpose of the 
traveller’s trip or the contents of his luggage than to suspect that he was disguised. Even 
when we drew attention to the issue of mask fraud, and informed participants that the 
traveller may be wearing a mask (categorical detection), only 90% of participants thought 
that he was. In other words, 10% of participants judged that Josh was not wearing a mask, 
even while viewing him from a distance of 2 metres. 
  
 
13
 
Table 2. Proportion (%) of participants who checked each reason to deny the traveller entry 
at the prompted detection stage. Participants were free to check as many or as few reasons as 
they liked. 
Reason to deny entry Yes (%) 
Disguised appearance 36 
Suspicious date of birth 34 
Drug check 55 
Wine limit 15 
Business trip 66 
 
Justification of Responses 
Participants gave a range of reasons for ‘Yes’ responses at the categorical detection 
stage. Most participants (78%) attributed their response to a specific cue. Figure 4 shows 
these responses broken down by face region. Unattributed detection accounted for only 22% 
of responses. 
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Figure 4. Proportions of written justifications that mentioned each cue (categorical detection 
task).  
 
Individual Differences 
To test whether unfamiliar face matching ability was associated with mask detection, 
we compared GFMT scores for participants who detected the mask at spontaneous or 
prompted report (N = 12, M = 83%, SD = 10%, Range = 68%–98%), and those who did not 
(N = 42, M = 81%, SD = 12%, Range = 50–100%). A between-subjects t-test revealed no 
significant difference between these subgroups either for overall GFMT scores or scores on 
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the match and mismatch conditions separately (all t’s < 1) . GFMT scores for participants 
who failed to detect the mask in the categorical (Yes/No) report were also normal (M = 85%, 
SD = 7%, Range = 75%-90%). 
 
General Discussion 
Previous research by Sanders et al. (2017) found that detection rates for hyper-realistic 
masks were remarkably low. In that study, participants relied on immediate memory of the 
masked confederate from 5 or 10 metres. In contrast, we allowed participants to view the 
mask wearer throughout testing, and from the shorter distance of just 2 metres, similar to 
passport control conditions (Noyes & Jenkins, 2017). These viewing conditions are much 
more conducive to mask detection, compared with previous work. Nonetheless, our findings 
follow a very similar pattern. Participants only detected the mask 22% of the time at 
spontaneous or prompted report. Even when explicitly asked whether or not the traveller was 
wearing a mask, 10% of viewers judged that he was not. Moreover, participants accepted the 
face of a mask wearer as matching a photo of another person 8% of the time (cf. Zamost, 
2010). These findings suggest that a hyper-realistic silicone mask can pass for a real face, 
even when viewers are aware that it could be a mask, and even when their viewing time is not 
restricted. 
Interestingly, participants singled out various aspects of facial appearance to explain 
their judgement (at the explicit question stage) that the traveller was wearing a mask. This 
wide range of justifications suggests that there may be no single cue that gave the mask away. 
A recent analysis by Sanders and Jenkins (2018) found that the most reliable differences 
between photos of real faces and photos of hyper-realistic masks were in the eye region, and 
that viewers who classified the photos accurately used information in that diagnostic area. 
However, that analysis was based on dozens of trials involving different faces and different 
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masks, whereas the current study involved one-shot decisions to a single mask wearer. 
Moreover, Sanders and Jenkins (2018) did not ask participants to explain their classification 
decisions. It seems entirely plausible that their participants were unaware of their reliance on 
the eye region. Previous studies have shown that insight into one’s own decision making is 
generally limited, and that participants often rationalise their own decisions post hoc (Nisbett 
& Wilson, 1977). This includes decisions concerning face identification (Sauerland et al. 
2016). Either way, we found little evidence in this task that successful mask detection could 
be attributed to any particular facial cue.  
Although the participants in this study were members of the general public, it is not 
clear that professionals whose work involves face viewing would perform any better (see 
Zamost, 2010, for a real-world example). Previous studies have shown that professional 
training and experience confer no discernable advantage in face identification tasks (Papesh, 
2018; White et al., 2014). While recent research has focused on the selection of individuals 
who naturally excel at such tasks (Bobak, Dowsett, & Bate, 2016; Bobak, Hancock, & Bate, 
2016; Davis, Lander, Evans, & Jansari, 2016), our findings did not show that greater GFMT 
scores were associated with earlier mask detection, and scores for those who did not detect 
the mask at all were within the normal range. The suggestion here is that face identification 
and mask detection may be separable problems. Any relation between them could be clarified 
by comparing performance distributions on the two tasks. 
Our previous studies on this topic have tested many different masks worn by many 
different people. That approach allowed us to generalise our observations across a range of 
viewing conditions. Here we took the complementary approach of testing a single mask in a 
more ecologically valid setting. Our findings provide an existence proof of an artificial face 
that can withstand direct scrutiny under live viewing conditions and at close range. The 
existence of such masks presents some interesting challenges for security and crime 
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prevention. For example, in one recent case, criminals used a silicone mask to impersonate a 
French minister for video calls with business leaders (Schofield, 2019). The criminals were 
able to defraud businesses of 80 million euros before being stopped. This case raises 
interesting issues for future research, including impersonation of faces that are familiar to the 
viewer. Some very recent work has shown that viewers are better able to see through 
impersonation disguise when they are familiar with the target of impersonation (Noyes & 
Jenkins, 2019). However, that work did not consider hyper-realistic face masks as disguises. 
It is possible that a moderate resemblance would be enough to fool a moderately familiar 
viewer, while a strong resemblance would be required to fool a highly familiar viewer. In the 
current study, 8% of participants accepted the image of our foil identity as a match to the 
mask, but this may be an underestimate of acceptance rates. Our foil image was selected from 
an existing database of face photos as a good match to our mask. However, in a real attempt 
at fraud, the perpetrator could have a mask created to resemble the face photo in a stolen 
passport, or could select a target who resembles an existing mask (e.g. Schofield, 2019). 
Either approach could make the resemblance between the mask and passport photo greater 
than was possible in this study, potentially leading to higher false acceptance rates. 
In order to mitigate human error at passport control, airports across the world have 
invested in e-Gates (electronic facial recognition technology) which use an algorithm to 
match a digital image stored on the passport to the passport holder’s face. Despite this 
investment, such systems are also prone to identification errors (Phillips et al., 2018). It is not 
clear how they would perform when comparing a passport image to a mask. In principle, e-
Gates could be modified to enhance mask detection. For example, infra-red imaging could be 
used to distinguish the thermal signature of a masked face from that of a real face. Given that 
the mask does not occlude the wearer’s eyes, an iris scan could identify the wearer. 
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Conclusions 
To conclude, this study extends the findings of Sanders et al. (2017) to an important 
applied situation. In a mock passport control task, we found that (i) a hyper-realistic mask 
was often accepted as a match to a stolen passport photo, (ii) spontaneous mask detection was 
remarkably rare, and (iii) raising awareness of mask-related fraud did not fully solve this 
problem. Based on these findings, we conclude that hyper-realistic masks pose an unresolved 
problem in identity fraud. 
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Appendix  
 
Left image shows the real face of mask wearer (Author JS), and with the addition of the mask 
on the right.  
 
 
  
 
